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As one of the key parts of corporate governance, top management turnover 
has been one of the hottest subjects in the international financial studies for a 
long time. However, such kind of research in mainland China is still few. This 
paper aims to make a deeper understanding to top management turnovers, 
especially the market reaction of top management turnover. 
 
At first, the paper makes a comprehensive introduction to the research results 
of financial academic field, including international and national financial 
academia, and summarizes the difficulties and the direction of future research 
in the field. Then, the paper analyzes the market reaction of top management 
turnover in China. The author finds that on the whole the market has an 
insignificantly negative reaction to the top management changes. Specifically, 
the market reaction to top management turnover in small firms and normal top 
management changes is significantly negative, while to forced top 
management turnover, the reaction is significantly positive, and there is no 
significant market reaction to top management turnover caused by other 
factors and interactions of them. In the specific field of CFO turnover, CFO 
turnover is preceded by an insignificant increase in the operating return in the 
pre-period, while followed an improvement in the operating return after the 
turnover; announcements of CFO turnover are associated with an insignificant 
stock price reaction generally. 
 
Characteristics of this paper are stated as follows. First, it enlarges the scope 
of top management from CEO, chairman and president to other positions such 
as vice chairman, vice president, CFO etc. Secondly, the paper classifies the 
announcement of administrative changes into three kinds, i.e. two-way 
turnover, departure and promotion of top management. Thirdly, this paper 
excludes those samples that multiple officers change simultaneously and only 














broadens those traditional-examined factors influencing the market reaction to 
more factors such as the source of successor, the dismissal reason etc. Fifthly, 
this paper uses the standard method of international research to calculate the 
abnormal return to reflect the market reaction, different from those made 
before in China. Finally, the paper uses the industry-adjusted performance, 
other than the market-adjusted performance that is usually used by former 
relevant research in China, to reflect the firm performance. 
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压力和内部的有效监控下, 经理们会倾向于更加努力工作, 从而 大化股
东财富, 这也正是公司有效治理的目的。勿容置疑，良好的公司治理是有
利于及时更换掉不合格的高管和挑选 有利于公司发展的高管。因此，高





































(Weisbach, 1988; Warner, Watts & Wruck, 1988; Coughlan & Schmidt, 1985；
Neumann & Voetamnn, 1999; Gaullagher & Nadarajah, 2003)。有研究表明，
                                                        






















并不会减少（Goldman, Hazarika & Shivdasani，2003）。其次，对于经营范
围分散的公司来说，公司业绩对高管变更的影响不大；而对经营范围集中
的公司来说，则影响较大（Berry, Bizjak, Lemmon & Naveen，2002）。再
次，高管变更考虑的公司业绩指标，是一个相对更加精确和对高管经营能
力更加敏感的指标。当会计指标更加精确和敏感时，高管变更与否更多的
是考虑会计指标，而非市场指标（Engel, Hayes & Huang，2003）。另外，
对转型经济国家来说，刚开始的时候，公司业绩对高管变更的影响并不大，
但在随后的年度开始逐步变得显著（Fidrmuc & Fidrmuc，2003）。 后，
公司业绩对 CEO 以下职位的高管，诸如子公司经理和部门经理变更影响






























高管（Yermack, 1996; Faleye, 2003)；董事长与 CEO 两职分离有利于提高
董事会评价 CEO 的客观性和独立性，从而有利于驱除经营业绩较差的高
管（Jagannathan, 1996; Goyal&Park, 2000) ；董事会成员持股量的增加提
高了高管变更对公司业绩的敏感程度（Bhagat & Black, 1999），而管理层
持股的增加则降低了高管变更对公司业绩的敏感性（Denis, Denis & Sarin, 
1997）；大股东出于其切身利益的考虑，其参与董事会有利于提高董事会
效率，从而使得股权集中度的提高有利于赶走不称职的高管（Warner el al, 
1988)。 
但是，也有的学者认为，董事会在选择高管方面并不具有真正的权利，
他们更多情况下是认可前任 CEO 的推荐（Mace, 1971），特别是当公司没
有一个关于高管变更相关规划的时候（Vancil, 1987）更是如此。 
（三）接任者来源 




影响更深远（Helmich & Brown, 1972; Helmich, 1974; Carlson, 1961)，所以
它更多的发生在公司需要剧烈变革的时候，例如在公司业绩较差的时候





















（Lucier, Schuyt & Spiegel, 2003），而来自内部的高管任期相对更长




应外部环境，所以，大公司高管变更的频率更大（Grusky, 1961; Kriesberg, 
1962; Trow, 1961;）。 
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